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1. INTRODUCTION
The last two decades have seen considerable growth in the level of
unemployment in the UK. Between 1960 and 1968, the average unemploy-
ment rate was 2.6 percent, by the first half of the 198O's this had risen to 10.5
percent. Along with rising unemployment, this period also saw changes in the
nature of unemployment, with unemployed individuals spending longer
periods out of work. Between 1979 and 1986 the proportion of unemployed
people who had been out of work for over a year rose from 20 percent to
approximately 40 percent. Recent work by Layard et al (1991) shows that
almost the entire growth in unemployment over this period can be attributed
to an increase in time spent unemployed rather than an increase in the inflow
rate into unemployment.
In this paper we examine the factors associated with long-term unemploy-
ment. In particular, we analyse the impact of unemployment benefits and
reservation wages on unemployment duration, in the context of an optimal
search model, making use of the procedures developed by Lancaster and
Chesher (1983, 1984). Our data also enable us to examine the extent to
which the government's Restart programme, introduced in 1987, succeeded
in reducing unemployment duration by altering individual's expectations.
Our results support the predictions of the job search model, in that higher
levels of both unemployment benefits and reservation wages significantly
increase time spent unemployed. Furthermore, we show that government
intervention can lead to substantial reductions in unemployment duration.
However, our results suggest that this is achieved either through altering the
demand side of the economy (increasing the arrival rate of job offers) or on
the supply side, by making individual search more effective, but not as a
tWe are grateful to Michael White. Jon Hales, the PSl and SCPR for help in accessing the
data and to Guido Imbens, Wilben Van der Klaauw. Tony Lancaster. Gerard Van den Berg,
Tony Atkinson, Ken Burdett. Audra Bowlus, Steve Nickell, Anthony Murphy and Michael
Armstrong (of the Newcastle Employment Service) for comments and suggestions. Peter
Dolton would like to thank the ESRC for funding towards this research from research grant
numbers R000233909 and H519255006. We alone are responsible for any errors
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result of altering individual expectations and subsequent reservation wages.
Our results suggest that the long-term unemployed have realistic expectations
of the wage they can expect to receive upon working. In particular, the reser-
vation wages quoted are approximately equal to the lowest wage necessary to
ensure a small positive payoff to working. Thus, while government interven-
tion may affect demand side conditions or alter individual search intensity, it
has Uttle scope for reducing unemployment duration through reductions in
the reservation wage.
In the next section of the paper we discuss the optimal search model upon
which our empirical results are based. We also discuss the non-parametric
derivation of the structural parameters of such a model following Lancaster
and Chesher (1983). In Section III we describe the data we use in detail,
paying particular attention to the controlled experiment on the Restart
programme. The data contain information on key variables such as
unemployment duration, reservation wages, expected wages and benefit
levels which enable us to provide estimates of the effect of the government's
Restart policy. Section IV presents the estimates of the structural parameters
obtained using the nonparametric approach developed by Lancaster and
Chesher (1983). Section V uses a parametric approach to estimate the search
model. This approach allows us to control for the potential endogeneity of
the reservation wage and also examine the impact of an array of personal
characteristics on both the reservation wage and unemployment duration. We
conclude with some remarks concerning the implications of our findings for
labour market policy.
II THE SEARCH THEORY FRAMEWORK EOR EXIT FROM UNEMPLOYMENT
In this section we briefly outline the standard model of optimal job search. In
particular we assume that risk neutral agents receive job offers according to a
Poisson process with arrival rate A. Such offers can be viewed as random
drawings from a known wage offer distribution with distribution function
F( w). On receiving an offer w, an individual has to decide whether to accept
that offer and earn w forever, or reject the offer and search for a better offer
next period. While searching the individual may receive non-labour income
in the form of a benefit level, b. Let F,, denote the value of search during the
next period, i.e. the present value of future net income given that the optimal
strategy will be pursued in the future and F,, the present value of stopping,
accepting the offer and working forever at that wage.' Assuming stationarity, .
' It IS straightforward to allow for job loss, with probability say, 5, in a given period in ihis
model. However, the inclusion of job loss in this fashion does not alter the basic results
presented below (see Lynch (1983)). This model, however, makes no attempt to model on-the-
job search. If we allow the worker to engage in costless search while working, then ^ = /> and the
elasticity of the reservation wage with respect to the benefit level becomes I. For a more
detailed discussion of this see Mortensen (1986), pp. 869-77.
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i.e. k and F{ w) independent of time, we can characterize the problem in terms
of the following equation:
{k + p)V,=b+XEm^x[V,,V,] (1)
where p is the individual's discount rate. For an individual faced with the
above problem the optimal strategy is to choose a reservation wage ^, such
that the individual will accept the first wage offer greater than or equal to | . It
can be easily shown that this reservation wage satisfies the following con-
dition:
) (2)
The rate at which individuals escape unemployment is simply:
h=X[\-Fm (3)
From equation (3) we see that the probability of exiting unemployment
depends on the rate at which job offers arrive and the probability that an
individual will accept this offer, which in turn is a function of the reservation
wage. It can be shown that under certain regularity conditions: a reduction in
b, a reduction in ^ or an increase in k will all lead to an increase in the
probability of exiting from unemployment (Van Den Berg, 1994).
Lancaster and Chesher (1983) have also shown that by differentiating both
the reservation wage given by (2) and the hazard function given in (3) with
respect to b and I, one can obtain estimates of the responsiveness of the
reservation wages and reemployment probability to changes in the offer
arrival rate and the level of unemployment benefits. The advantage of this
approach is that by combining the restrictions implied by the optimal job
search model with information on reservation wages and expected wages we
can deduce many of the structural parameters of the model without specify-
ing the nature of^  the unknown wage offer distribution. The procedure also
allows us to compare the magnitudes of the estimates obtained in this fashion,
with those obtained using the more standard parametric procedures adopted
later in the paper.
Using the restrictions embodied in the reservation equation (2), Lancaster
and Chesher show that the elasticities of the reservation wage with respect to
the benefit level and the arrival rate of offers can be written as:
bix^
dlogZj ^[x-b)
and
d\og^J^-b){x-^)
dlogA ^ [x-b)
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where b, A and ^ are as defined above and x is the expected wage given that
this wage is accepted (i.e. £[w|wS^J).
Using these equations and information on b, x and ^ we can determine the
extent to which the reservation wage is affected by changes in the benefit level
and the offer arrival rate. In order to determine the impact of these variables
on the hazard rate h (the probability of leaving unemployment given that a
job has not yet been found) we need to specify a form for the wage offer
distribution. Again Lancaster and Chesher show that if one adopts the Pareto
Distribution then the elasticities can be written as
dlog h ^ b X
dlogfc ^(x~b)
and
dlog h dlog ^
dlog A dlog b
(7)
To examine the robustness of our estimates to the Pareto assumption we
also estimate these last two elasticities assuming that the wage offer distribu-
tion has an exponential rather than Pareto distribution. Under the exponen-
tial assumption it can be shown that:
d\ogb {x-b)
and
dlog A ix-b) (9)
We can calculate the above elasticities for each individual using that
individual's value of b. ^ and x. The results we report represent the mean
values of these elasticities across individuals.-
III. DATA
In April 1987 the government introduced the Restart programme, which was
a system of six-monthly meetings between the unemployed individual and a
counsellor, with the first meeting taking place when the individual had
reached their sixth month of unemployment. The aim of the programme was
-We have also computed these elasticities by taking the mean values of b, ^ and x, for the
sample first and then applying the formula. This is the method used by Lancaster and Chesher.
Our results are not sensitive to this method of calculation.
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to review the position of people experiencing long-term unemployment.
During the interview the Restart counsellor assessed the claimant's recent
unemployment history and offered advice on benefits, search behaviour,
training courses and in a minority of cases initiated direct contact with
employers. The goal of the Restart process was to reduce the amount of time
spent in unemployment and also reduce claims of unemployment benefit by
those who did not satisfy the eligibility requirement (i.e. that they be available
and actively seeking work). Attendance at the Restart interview was manda-
tory in that failure to do so could result in benefits being reduced or
.suspended.
In 1989 the Policy Studies Institute (PSI) were commissioned by the
Employment Service (ES) to evaluate the impact of Restart. To do this they
identified the sample of individuals approaching their sixth month of
unemployment in the period March-July 1989. A random sample of 8,925
of these individuals was chosen to take part in the study. Every ES office in
Britain was contacted in order to eliminate regional biases and provide a
nationally representative sample. Individuals were selected into the sample
on the basis of their National Insurance (NI) numbers. Of this set a control
group of 582 people was randomly selected, again based on NI digit
sequences. Members of the control group, although eligible for the interview
were not asked to attend the initial Restart interview. It is the existence of this
control group which allows us to examine the extent to which government
intervention, in the form of Restart, altered people's pattern of unemploy-
ment and in particular the extent to which expectations and reservation wages
changed as a result of the Restart process.
About six months after the initial Restart interview, the survey organiza-
tion. Social and Community Planning Research, conducted a survey of these
same individuals in which detailed information was obtained on subsequent
work history, personal characteristics, the Restart interview, previous
employment history, job search behaviour and benefit income. Of the original
sample, 5,200 individuals completed this survey, which was conducted
between September and October 1989.^
The structure of the sample was such that it could be linked to administra-
tive data collected by the Department of Employment. Of particular
relevance for our study is the fact that individuals in the sample could be
linked to the Department's JUVOS data, which records the unemployment
history of individuals on a monthly basis dating back to January 1982.
JUVOS thus provides us with accurate administrative records on claimants
unemployment history, while also allowing us to control for the individual's
unemployment experiences in spells preceding the current spell. The survey
'Although the issue of attrition arises with the survey data, estimates of a probit equation
determining survey participation show that the decision to participate in the survey was
independent of control group status. As a result the examination of the impact of Restart is
unaffected by the attrition.
© Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1995
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also contained information on the individual's travel to work area, which was
matched with the National Online Manpower Information System to obtain
monthly data on local labour market conditions. These data are used to
condition out local demand conditions from our analysis. Summary statistics
for the variables used in this study are presented in Table 1 of the Appendix.
The results are reported by control group status and clearly indicate the
random nature of the assignment.
As is evident from the model discussed in Section II, nonparametric
estimation of the structural parameters requires information on the indi-
vidual's level of benefits b, reservation wage ^ and expected wage x. To cal-
culate benefit levels we use individual responses to a survey question
concerning benefits. In the survey each individual was asked to state whether
they or their partner were currently receiving benefits and if so to state their
current level of benefits by type, i.e. Income support. Unemployment Benefit,
Family Credit or Housing Benefit. In the UK welfare system, the most
important of these sources of benefits are Unemployment Benefit and
Income Support. Unemployment Benefit is a contributory insurance scheme
available to everyone aged between 16 and 65. While working, individuals
pay National Insurance contributions which go into the National Insurance
fund which is then used to pay Unemployment Benefit when the individual
becomes unemployed. Unemployment benefits can then be paid for up to
312 days (a year not counting Sundays) in any period of unemployment. In
April 1989 the standard weekly rate of benefit was £34.70. Income Support
on the other hand is a non-contributory means tested benefit payable to
anyone 18 or over (and in special cases 16) who has left school and is not in
remunerative work where his or her income and capital are insufficient to
meet their day to day living expenses. To claim Income Support an individual
must be available for and actively seeking employment. In 1989 the standard
rate for a single individual aged over 25 was £34.90.
Rather than use actual benefits as reported by the individual as our
measure of welfare receipts we used these reported values combined with the
individual's characteristics to estimate benefit entitlement. The use of indi-
vidual characteristics to instrument the benefit level overcomes a potential
self-selection problem which may arise when using actual reported benefits,
in that individuals who reported receiving benefits at the time of the survey
(approximately 12 months after the spell began) are unlikely to be a random
sample of the population. The regression specification and results from this
procedure are given in Table A2 of the Appendix'* and confirm prior expecta-
tions with married people with dependent children, living in rented accom-
modation and whose spouse was not working, receiving the most benefits.
In estimating ^ and x we follow the other papers in this area (for example
Lancaster and Chesher (1983), Lynch (1983), Main and Shelley (1988),
^ Later in the paper we include this benefit measure m an unemployment duration equation.
This system is identified by the inclusion of the health variable and the variable indicating
whether one lived alone or not in the benefit equation but not in the duration equation.
© BlackweU Publishers Ltd. 1995
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TABLE 1
Summary Statistics Used in Elasticity Calculations
£ per week
Benefits
Reservation wage
Expected wage
Sample size
All
43.73
103.08
119.17
3520
Control
42.96
100.88
116.21
226
Treatment
43.79
103.23
119.38
3294
Exit
42.38
102.41
118.65
2700
No exit
48.21
105.27
120.87
820
Jones (1988) and Gorter and Gorter (1993)) and u.se as a measure of | the
individual's response to the question 'What is the lowest weekly take home
pay you would consider?'. To measure x we use responses to the question
'When looking for a job, what weekly take home pay do you expect?'. The
optimal search model outlined earlier predicts that b^ ^^ x. In order to be
consistent with the theory we eliminate the cases for which this restriction
fails. Of the 3,625 individuals for which we had valid data, 105 cases violated
this condition. This left us with a sample size of 3,520, which is significantly
larger than that used in previous studies (the sample sizes in Gorter and
Gorter, Jones, Lancaster and Chesher, Main and Shelley and Lynch were
213, 845, 639, 838 and 52 respectively). The larger sample size should allow
us to get more precise estimates of the structural parameters.^ In this paper
we estimate the elasticities for everyone, by control group status and also
conditional on exit status in order to determine the extent to which the para-
meters vary across subgroups. The summary statistics for the relevant
variables are given in Table AL These figures themselves reveal some interest-
ing differences between the groups. In particular, we note that individuals
who failed to exit unemployment over the 16 month period for which we
have information, have, on average £6 a week more benefits than those who
exited. There seems to be little difference in benefit levels, reservation wages
or expected wages between the control group (who were excluded from the
initial Restart interview) and the Treatment Group who received the inter-
view.
To see the implications of these figures for unemployment duration we
estimate the elasticities discussed in Section II. The results of these estimates
are presented in Table 2.'' The first five columns of the Table report the
Mn our sample 1,438 (41 percent) individuals reported a value of ^ = A-. The corresponding
percentages for the other studies were 25 percent for Mam and Shelly, 47 percent for Gorter
and Gorter and 46 percent for Lancaster and Chesher. although in the latter case the responses
were grouped into intervals. While such responses are not impossible in a search model, they
do imply the variance of the wage offer distribution is zero. We will return to this issue later.
"The elasticities obtained from excluding those individuals who reported ^ =x are reported
in Table A3 of the Appendix. While the elasticity of the reservation wage with respect to both
the arrival rate of offers and the benefit level rise, our comparison of the control and treatment
group IS unaffected by the exclusion of these individuals.
C Blackwell Pubhshers Ltd. 1995.
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results for our various subsamples, while the final four columns report esti-
mates from previous research using this approach (Lancaster and Chesher
(1983), Lynch (1983), Main and Shelly (1988) and Gorter and Gorter
(1993)). Comparing our results for all Restart members in column 6 with
those of the other studies we find that while our results are within the range of
e.stimates from the previous studies, there are some differences. In particular
we note that the elasticity of the reservation wage with respect to benefits
appears to be quite low: a 10 percent increase in benefit levels raising the
reservation wage by 1.1 percent. Using the mean level of benefits and reser-
vation wages, this implies that a £1 rise in benefits would raise the reservation
wage by 25p. One possibility for the difference between our estimate
and that of Lancaster and Chesher maybe that our sample consists of
workers who were unemployed at least six months, whereas the Lancaster
and Chesher estimates refer to a sample from the stock of all unemployed
workers. As a result the reservation wage reported by the individuals in our
sample may already be at the minimum level necessary to insure a positive
payoff to work. To the extent that the reservation wage may become more
rigid in a downward direction the longer the unemployment spell continues,
we might expect changes in benefits to have less of an effect on reservation
wages in our sample than in other studies. Evidence that this may indeed be
the case can be found in Lancaster and Chesher, who find that the elasticity is
highest for individuals with between 3 and 6 months' unemployment and
lower for those with longer spells. If we use their data on reservation wages,
expected wages and calculated elasticities for individuals with between 6 and
8 months' unemployment we find that a £1 rise in the benefit levels would
raise the reservation wage by 23p which is close to the figure of 25p which we
find.
Our estimate of the elasticity of the reservation wage with respect to offer
arrival rate is 0.10 which again is lower than the estimates of 0.11, 0.15 and
0.14 reported by Lancaster and Chesher (1983), Lynch (1983) and Main and
Shelly (1988) respectively. Again, however, it is interesting to note that our
estimate is equal to that obtained by Lancaster and Chesher for sample
members who were unemployed for between 6 and 12 months.
The third row shows the elasticity of re-employment with respect to
unemployment benefits under the Pareto assumption, while the sixth row
reports the estimate under the Exponential assumption. Our estimate of the
elasticity is close to 1 and appears robust to our assumptions on the wage
offer distribution.^ Later in the paper we estimate a search model using a
parametric 2SLS approach. This approach can also be used to estimate the
structural parameters of the model. It is worth noting at this stage that the
^Our figure is substantially lower than the estimate of -2.89 obtained in Gorter and Gorter.
However, using parametric procedures Gorter and Gorter are unable to fmd a significant effect
of either benefits or reservation wages on duration. This leads them to question the robustness
of their reported estimates.
© Blackwell Publishers Lid. 1995.
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estimated benefit elasticity obtained in this manner is -1.63 with a standard
error of 0.09.'* Combining our two results we find that our benefit elasticity is
similar to the range of 0.6 to 1 suggested by Lancaster and Chesher (1983),
Lancaster and Nickell (1980) and Nickell (1979) but higher than the 0.1 to
0.3 range suggested by Atkinson et al. (1984) and Narendranathan et al.
(1985).
The fourth and seventh rows of Table 2 report the elasticity of re-employ-
ment probability with respect to changes in the offer arrival rate, under the
Pareto and Exponential assumptions respectively.'' These results suggest an
estimate in the range of 0.1 to 0.2. An alternative interpretation of these
figures can be obtained if one assumes the hazard function for a given indi-
vidual is constant over time. In this instance an individual's completed
unemployment duration has an exponential distribution, with mean l//j. The
elasticity of mean unemployment duration with respect to the offer arrival
rate is then the negative of the estimates given in rows 4 and 7. Our results
imply that a 10 percent fall in the mean time between offers is associated with
a 1 to 2 percent reduction in the average length of unemployment duration.
The fifth row of the Table reports the estimates of CT, the standard devia-
tion of log wage offers. Our estimate of 0.13 is similar to that reported by
Lancaster and Chesher and also the value of 0.17 calculated by Jones using
the 2SLS procedure.
In discussing the nature of the Restart programme in Section III, it was
noted that the programme worked through several channels. One such
channel was the threat of benefit suspension for individuals who did not meet
the eligibility criteria. In particular, if it was deemed by the Restart counsellor
that a claimant was severely restricting the type of work which they would
be willing to do, then benefits could be cut or suspended. One way of restrict-
ing work options is by setting unrealistic reservation wages, which would lead
to individuals being very selective about the jobs which they would accept. In
introducing Restart it was believed that a potential impact would be to either
lower reservation wages or increase individual responsiveness to job arrivals
as a result of the threat of benefit reduction, which would in turn lead to
shorter spells of unemployment. The first four columns of Table 2 provide a
breakdown of the elasticity estimates by control and exit status. Comparing
our elasticities across subgroups we find very little difference either between
the control and treatment group or between those who exited unemployment
and those who did not. The lack of difference between the control and treat-
ment group is also evident in the reservation wage and expected wage
reported in Table 1, where members of the control group reported a reserva-
''Thi.s estimate rs from the reduced form 2SLS unemployment duration equation not
reported in the texl.
"In the Table we present the estimates reported by Lancaster and Chesher and by Lynch in
their papers. However, these authors seemed to have overlooked the fact that under the Pareto
assumption these elasticities should be equal to the elasticity of the reservation wage with
respect to the benefit level.
C Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1995.
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tion wage of £101 while members of the treatment group reported a reserva-
tion wage of £103. The similarity between the two groups is again a possible
consequence of the fact that there is little scope for further downward
revision of reservation wages for our sample of iong-term unemployed. In
particular, the harsh reality of experiencing 6 months' unemployment and
frustrating job search is probably enough to induce a fairly realistic percep-
tion of the wage a person could command in the market.'" This conclusion
leads us to suggest that the main aspects of the Restart program may not be to
lower reservation wages but rather to change A, i.e. the rate at which job
offers arrive either through initiating contact with employers or by inducing
more effective and efficient job search. We turn to these issues in the next
section, where a simultaneous equations approach allows us to control for
individual characteristics over and above control group status.
IV. SIMULTANEOUS EOUATION ESTIMATES OF THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN BENEFITS. RESERVATION WAGES AND SEARCH DURATION
While the above approach provides us with a means of deducing many of the
structural parameters of the job search model without specifying a form for
the wage offer distribution, it is limited by the fact that examination of the
impact of local labour market conditions and personal characteristics on
reservation wages and unemployment duration is cumbersome. The results
are also conditional on the maintained assumption that the search model is
the appropriate model underlying the process, an assumption which cannot
be tested in the above framework. Furthermore, the elasticity estimates
examine only one channel through which Restart may work, namely by
changing individual expectations and as a result changing the minimum wage
necessary to induce them to work. To allow for an examination of the impact
of an array of personal characteristics on unemployment duration and reser-
vation wages and also an examination of alternative channels through which
Restart may reduce unemployment duration we adopt the structural model
proposed by Lancaster and Chesher (1984), Lancaster (1985) and Jones
(1988). They show that by using log-linear approximations to key functional
relations in the job search model one can write the model as a system of
ordinary log-linear simultaneous equations, which can be estimated using
2SLS on elapsed durations. This model also allows us to test a key prediction
of the search model, namely that reservation wages are positively correlated
with unemployment duration. Using the same notation as previously we can
'"It is interesting to note that as part of the Restart process in operation today. Restart
officers provide advice to claimants regarding what is a realistic asking wage in light of their
personal benefit circumstances and the market situation. This process takes place after the
claimant states an initial minimum wage at which they would be prepared to work.
© Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1995.
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write the model as:
ln^=-A,lnf + x;^, + j?, (10)
lnt = ^ .Jn^ + X',^^ + T)2 (11)
With a dummy for control status included in the X variables this allows us
to examine the precise channels through which Restart effects unemployment
duration. By simultaneously modelling the reservation wage and unemploy-
ment duration this approach also overcomes the potential problem of endo-
geneity. As noted by Lancaster and Chesher, if we observe an individual who
has been out of work a long time, then we could argue that they are likely to
have been using a relatively high reservation wage. On the other hand if
people become less choosy the longer they become unemployed, then the
longer one is out of work the lower their reservation wage will be. The exist-
ence of two causal relationships between ^ and t means that if we are to
model this relationship correctly we have no choice but to treat the model as
a simultaneous system.''
Since the model consists of two simultaneous equations, the issue of
identification naturally arises. In estimating the model we use the following
exclusion restrictions to identify the parameters of the duration equation: we
assume that one's benefit level, the presence of children and the presence of a
working partner determine your reservation wage but have no direct effect on
your re-employment probability. These exclusion restrictions are of the same
nature to those used by Lancaster (1985) who excluded dependent children
from the duration equation, since this was viewed as a determinant of the
level of unemployment benefit and Jones (1988) who excluded the benefit
variable from the duration equation. The consensus in the literature,
however, is that exclusion restrictions alone cannot be used to identify the
reservation wage equation. As noted by Lancaster (1985) and Kiefer and
Neumann (1979), for individuals acting rationally, every variable which
affects their re-employment probability should also affect their reservation
wage. However, for our purpose the reduced form of the reservation wage
equation will suffice to establish (or refute) the existence of a relationship
between the control variables and the reservation wage. Of particular
concern to us in this paper is the impact of the Restart interview. To capture
this we include a control group dummy in both the reservation wage equation
and the duration equation, which takes the value 1 if the individual was
excluded from the Restart process. This allows us to examine the impact of
Restart on the reservation wage and also on unemployment duration after
having netted out the impact of the reservation wage.
As in Section III we use the individual's response to the question concern-
ing the minimum wage which they would be prepared to work for, as a
"There were earlier attempts lo overcome the endogeneity problem, notably Crosslin and
Stevens (1977) but they adopted a 2SLS framework with no regard to the fact that the time
spent unemployed is a duration variable.
C BlackweU Publishers Ltd. 1995
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measure of the individucil's reservation wage. As before, we restrict attention
to the group of individuals who reported rational measures of b, x and ^.
Tbe results of this model are presented in Table 3 and Table A4 of the
appendix.
Table 3 shows the structural estimates of the duration equation. A key
prediction of the search model is the positive relationship between
unemployment duration and reservation wages. Looking at Table 3 we find
that the elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to the reservation
wage is 3.2 and highly significant. This is comparable to previous estimates
using this approach: Jones (1988) obtained estimates in the range 2.7 to 7.2,
while Lancaster obtained an estimate of 1.8. The estimates support the job
search model and are in contrast to the results reported by Gorter and Gorter
(1993) who concluded that the level of unemployment benefit and the reser-
vation wage were not important in ending a search spell. However, as
mentioned earlier the results obtained by Gorter and Gorter differed sub-
stantially depending on the procedure adopted, which raises issues concern-
ing the robustness of their estimates.
TABLE 3
2SLS Estimates of Simultaneous Equation Search Model
Log duration equation
Variable Esttmate S.E.
Log res. wage 3.19 0,19
Control 0.207 0.053
Sex -0.856 0.063
Age 25 -0.333 0.043
Age 35 -0,490 0.057
Age 45 -0.416 0.057
Age 55 -0.091 0.057
Married -0.530 0.040
Divorced -0.303 0.053
Local unemp. -1.128 0.246
Inner city 0.086 0.034
Race 0.368 0.090
Education -0.214 0.029
Driver -0.333 0.032
Rent house - 0.082 0.032
Other house 0.040 0.116
Past unemp. 0.132 0.055
Constant -11,46 0.805
R- 0.113
N 3520
© Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1995,
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The coefficient on the reservation wage measures the elasticity of the
hazard with respect to the reservation wage, and imphes that an individual
who raises their asking wage by 10 percent cuts their chances obtaining work
by 32 percent. We can also use our estimate of /Sj to make inferences about
the shape of the wage offer distribution. It can be easily shown that under the
assumption that the wage offers have a Pareto distribution with scale para-
meter o then a = - I/a, where a is a measure of the standard deviation of log
wages or approximately (as a tends to 0) the coefficient of variation of offers.
Using our estimate of - 3.2 we obtain a measure of a equal to 0.31, which is
higher than our estimate of 0.14 reported using the nonparametric procedure
as well as those of Lynch (0.19) and Lancaster and Chesher (0.13), but is
comparable to previous estimates using the simultaneous equations
approach: Jones reports estimates of a in the remge 0.14 to 0.37, while
Lancaster and Chesher obtained an estimate of 0.55.
The coefficients on the other control variables in our model are as
expected. In particular we fmd that single people, who live in the itiner city,
with no qualifications and no driver's licence are all likely to spend longer in
unemployment. We also find that those in the treatment group who were
subjected to the Restart interview process appear to have significantly faster
exit rates from unemployment. Since we have normalized for the role of the
reservation wage in the simultaneous equation system we must interpret this
significant control group coefficient as evidence that those who do not have a
Restart interview experience a lower arrival rate of offers which hinders their
exit from unemployment. Again we find that although government interven-
tionist policy can significantly reduce unemployment durations for the long-
term unemployed, it appears to do so by increasing the offer arrival rate of
jobs or by teaching individuals to search more effectively, but not by reducing
reservation wages under the threat of benefit suspension.
Table A4 shows the reduced form estimates of the reservation wage
equation. The estimates are both intuitive and similar to those obtained
previously (Kiefer and Neumann (1979)). In particular we note that the reser-
vation wage is higher for males, individuals whose spouse is working, the
more educated and is also increasing in age. Furthermore we note that in
keeping with the search model, individuals with high levels of unemployment
benefit also have higher reservation wages. The results also suggest that reser-
vation wages are not significantly different between those receiving the
Restart interview cind individuals excluded from the Restart process. This is
consistent with the conclusion reached earlier on the basis of nonparametric
estimates. These results suggest that government intervention in the form of
Restart had httle impact on individuals' reservation wages. However, they do
not rule out a role for Restart. The positive and significant coefficient on the
control variable in the duration equation suggests that unemployment
duration is significantly lower for those individuals who went through the
Restart process. This combined with the insignificance of the control variable
in the reservation wage equation suggests that Restart works by increasing the
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arrival rate of job offers either through increasing search intensity or through
initiating a direct contact with an employer rather than changing the reserva-
tion wage that an individual will accept for a given job offer.
V CONCLUSION
In this paper we have used a unique data set to examine the determinants of
long-term unemployment. These data also allow us to conduct a direct test of
a key prediction of the optimal job search model, namely that individual
reservation wages and the duration of unemployment spells are positively
correlated. Our findings support the job search model, with a 10 percent
increase in the reservation wage increasing unemployment duration by 32
percent after allowing for possible simultaneity between unemployment
duration and the reservation wage.
The nature of our sample also allows us to examine the potential for
government policy, and in particular the Restart program, to reduce the
duration of unemployment. Our findings show that while Restart may be
effective in reducing unemployment duration, it appears to do this by chang-
ing the rate at which job offers arrive, either through initiation of contact with
employers or through improvements in the search behaviour of the
unemployed. Our results show that the Restart programme had little impact
on the reservation wages of the long-term unemployed. This suggests that for
our sample of long-term unemployed, the reservation wages reported are
accurate assessments of the minimum wage needed to ensure a positive
payoff to work, which as a result limits the ability of the government to put
downward pressure on the reservation wage. The notion that long-term
unemployment is high because individuals have unrealistic expectations of
their potential worth is not supported in our data.
University of Newcastle upon Tyne and Maynooth College, Ireland
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APPENDIX
Variable Description
Res. Wage: Reservation wage constructed from the question 'What is the
lowest take-home pay you would consider?'.
Inner City: Inner city identifier (1 = inner city).
Sex: Sex (1 = Male, 0 = Female).
Past Unemp.: Proportion of the individuals' working life since 1982 which
was spent in unemployment, calculated from JUVOS data.
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Dep. Kids: Total number of dependent kids (< = 16).
Toddlers: Total number of toddlers (< =5).
Local Unemp.: For each 1978jcttwa (job centre travel to work area) this
variable measures the decline in unemployment between 1988 and 1990
(Average local unemployment in 1988-Average local unemployment in
1990).
Control: Restart sub-group (1 = control).
Driver: Do you hold a current drivers' licence (1 = yes).
Married: Married (1 = yes).
Divorced: Divorced/Separated/Widowed (1 =yes).
Race: Race of respondent (1 = white).
Education: Any academic or technical qualification (1 = yes).
Active Partner: Partner working (full or part-time) (1 = yes).
Benefit Entitlement: Predicted benefit entitlement.
Rent House: Rent house from Housing Association etc. (1 = yes).
TABLE AI
Summary Statistics
Variable
Re.s. wage
Benefit entitle-
ment
Sex
Age 25
Age 35
Age 45
Age 55
Married
Divorced
Dep. Kids
Toddlers
Local unemp.
Inner city
Race
Education
Driver
Rent house
Other house
Past unemp.
Active partner
/V
Treatment group
Mean
103.23
43.79
0.701
0.280
0.166
0.124
0.083
0.450
0.098
0.493
0.276
0.348
0.182
0.977
0.559
0.482
0.336
0.012
0.409
0.211 ,
3294
S.E.
0.743
0.331
0.008
0.008
0.007
0.006
0.005
0.009
0.005
0.016
0.011
0.001
0.007
0.003
0.009
0.009
0.008
0.002
0.005
0.007
Control group
Mean
100.88
42.96
0.695
0.257
0.204
0.133
0.080
0.442
0.133
0.482
0.261
0 345
0.190
0.974
0.558
0.513
0.363
0.022
0.408
0.252
226
S.E.
2.36
1.89
0.031
0.029
0.027
0.023
0.018
0.033
0.023
0.071
0.044
0.003
0.026
0.011
0.033
0.033
0.032
0.010
0.018
0.029
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Own House: Own/buying house on mortgage.
Other House: Other form of accommodation other than homeowner, renting
from Local Authority or renting privately (e.g. living rent free, squatting...)
(l=yes).
Age 25: A dummy variable taking the value 1 if the individual is aged
between 25 and 35. A similar definition applies to Age 35 and Age 45
while Age 55 indicates individuals aged 55 or over.
Ever Paid: Ever worked in a paid job between leaving school and present
claim?
Health: Any health problems or disabihties (1 = yes).
Alone: Do you live alone (1 = yes).
Recent Job: Have you held a job in the 5 years preceding the current claim
(l=yes).
U.B. Expired: 1 if the current claim has lasted longer than 12 months, the
limit for payment of unemployment benefits.
Note: The reference groups for the age variable used in Table 2, was whether
the individual was aged less than 25.
TABLE A2
Specification Used to Predict Benefit Entitlement
(Dependent Variable: Reported Total Benefits)
Variable Estimate SE.
Ever paid
Active partner
Sex
Age 25
Age 35
Age 45
Age 55
Married
Divorced
Dep. kids
Toddlers
Rent house
Own house
U.B. expired
Alone
Recent job
Health
Constant
A'
R-
2.252
-37.674
4.577
3.366
2.462
-2.807
-10.916
20.930
4.062
8.473
-3.122
11.934
10.352
3.038
3.189
-0.721
1.174
24.49
2873
0.485
1.622
1.406
0.937
1.107
1.356
1.514
1.735
1.655
1.428
0.646
0.965
1.434
1.616
0.834
1.511
1.J07
0.830
1.469
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Variable
TABLE A4
Reduced Form Estimates of the Reservation Wage Equation
(Dependent Variable: Log Res. Wage)
Log reservation wage equation
Estimate S.E.
Benefit entitlement
Control
Sex
Age 25
Age 35
Age 45
Age 55
Married
Divorced
Dep. kids
Toddlers
Active partner
Local unemp.
Inner city
Race
Education
Driver
Rent house
Other house
Past unemp.
Constant
R-
N
0.010
-0.018
0.214
0.068
0.129
0.162
0.145
-0.107
0.001
-0.034
0.009
0.236
0.018
0.005
-0.120
0.044
0.076
-0.051
0.030
-0.018
3.98
0.290
3520
0.001
0.021
0.014
0.017
0.020
0.020
0.025
0.037
0.023
0.015
0.014
0.054
0.100
0.014
0.035
0.011
0.011
0.017
0.047
0.023
0.066
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